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Abstract: While criminologists have for some time examined state and corporate crime as separate entities, the
concept of state-corporate crime highlighting joint government and private corporate action causing criminal harm is
a recent area of study with relatively few published case studies (Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000). This paper focuses
on state-corporate crime at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) in Paducah, Kentucky, and contributes
to the study of state-corporate crime in three ways: (1) it adds a new case study to a field in which there are few
published accounts, (2) it assesses the utility of Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998) integrated theoretical framework of
state-corporate crime by applying it to understanding harms at PGDP, and (3) it demonstrates how the state role in
state-corporate crime can evolve from that of instigator to facilitator. PGDP is an especially important case study
in the field of state-corporate crime because it constitutes a rare instance in which the federal government has both
acknowledged and apologized for its role in harms caused to plant workers and the environment.
Keywords: State-corporate crime; Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
Introduction
Nuclear workers’ compensation is a national
debt long due to our Cold War veterans who’ve
paid the highest price possible for their service.
— Energy Secretary Bill Richardson
(Carroll, 2000b)
A USA Today series, “Poisoned Workers and
Poisoned Places” (Eisler, 2000), brought public attention to the ever-growing evidence of government and
corporate misconduct in the nuclear industry. The series
described how the U.S. government hired companies to
process nuclear materials, and estimated that about 550
plants may have conducted work related to the government’s nuclear program. The series further described
how health and environmental problems at these facilities
were kept secret by government officials and company
executives (Eisler, 2000). This paper examines activities and their resulting harms at one nuclear facility, the
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP), near Paducah,
Kentucky. Our examination of the activities and harms at
PGDP that led to Energy Secretary Richardson’s apology
to plant employees on behalf of the federal government
leads us to classify the harms at PGDP as state-corporate
crime. PGDP activities demonstrate the harm potential
from state-corporate crime and necessity of continued
study in this area; at a time when federal government is

considering renewed and increased reliance on nuclear
power (e.g., Baker and Mufson, 2006), examination of
harms stemming from the nuclear industry is of particular
importance. This paper contributes to the study of statecorporate crime in three ways: (1) it adds a new case study
to a field in which there are few published accounts, (2)
it assesses the utility of Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998)
integrated theoretical framework of state-corporate crime
through application to understanding harms at PGDP, and
(3) it demonstrates how the state role in state-corporate
crime can change over time from that of instigator to
facilitator.
Traditional Criminological Research
and State-Corporate Crime
Historically, criminological research has focused
on law violations by individuals, neglecting state activities performed in pursuit of apparently legitimate goals.
Official sources of crime data reinforce this traditional
criminological focus by emphasizing individual acts and
one-on-one harms (Reiman, 2001). Recently, however,
state-corporate crime has emerged as an area of research
recognizing the need to extend traditional criminological
focus beyond the individual’s violation of law (Kramer,
1992; Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1993; Kauzlarich and
Kramer, 1998; Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000).
The importance of state-corporate crime as a research
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focus is highlighted by damage described in the few studies of state-corporate crime published to date (Kramer,
1992; Aulette and Michalowski, 1993; Kauzlarich and
Kramer, 1993; Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000); moreover, the extent of harm from state-corporate crime likely
extends beyond injury and financial cost to a general loss
of confidence in government. Examination of state-corporate crime also reveals a general lack of preparation for
dealing with disaster; although technology has developed
at breakneck speed, a parallel development of safety and
rescue technology has not occurred. History is replete
with examples, all too often ignored, of what happens
when technology goes awry (Perrow, 1984).
The complexity of state-corporate crime arises from
the nature of the offenses; unlike traditional “street crime,”
state-corporate crime is not characterized by the intent of
a single actor to violate law for personal pleasure or gain.
Criminal actions by the state often lack an obvious victim, and diffusion of responsibility arising from corporate
structure and involvement of multiple actors makes the
task of attributing criminal responsibility difficult (Stone,
1978; Clinard and Yeager, 1980; Becker, Jipson, and
Bruce, 2000). Furthermore, sufficient understanding of
state-corporate crime cannot be gained through studying
individual actors; one must also consider broader organizational and societal factors. The integrated theoretical
framework proposed by Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998),
proposes analysis of events at institutional, organizational, and interactional levels and, we believe, is especially
useful for analysis of state-corporate crime.
State-Corporate Crime Defined
Kramer, Michalowski, and Kauzlarich (2002) describe the origins, development and status of state-corporate crime theory. Kramer et al. note that the study of
state-corporate crime emerged from earlier research on
white-collar and organizational offending. In his study
of the 1986 space shuttle Challenger disaster, Kramer
(1992) found the disaster could best be explained by
considering the interaction between the state and a corporation, specifically “(t)he National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), a governmental agency,
and Morton Thiokol, Inc., a private business corporation”
(Kramer et al., 2002:268). Kramer recognized existing
research had failed to examine the longstanding relationships between corporations and government that result
in public harm. While criminologists had studied crime
by government and crime by private corporations these
were effectively two separate research camps; Kramer’s
Challenger shuttle disaster research brought the two
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camps together, revealing how a state-corporate relationship can result in criminal harm. Subsequent research
revealed differences in the relationship between government and corporation in state-corporate crime. For example, while Kramer (1992) demonstrated how the state
can actively initiate a state-corporate relationship resulting in crime, Aulette and Michalowski’s (1993) study of a
fire at Imperial Food Products in Hamlet, NC, that caused
25 deaths and multiple injuries revealed a more passive
governmental role in which failure to enforce regulations
allowed a corporation to continue the deliberate violation
of safety standards. Recognition of differences in the
state-corporate relationship has led to recognition of two
distinct forms of state-corporate crime—state-initiated
and state-facilitated:
State-initiated corporate crime (such as the
Challenger explosion) occurs when corporations, employed by the government, engage in
organizational deviance at the direction of, or
with the tacit approval of, the government. Statefacilitated state-corporate crime (such as the
Imperial Food Products fire in Hamlet) occurs
when government regulatory institutions fail to
restrain deviant activities either because of direct collusion between business and government
or because they adhere to shared goals whose
attainment would be hampered by aggressive
regulation. (Kramer et al., 2002:271-272)
While this distinction between state-initiated and
state-facilitated corporate crime is important, our examination of events at PGDP contributes to the study of
state-corporate crime by demonstrating how evolving
state behavior can transform the role of the state from
that of instigator to facilitator of state-corporate crime; it
is apparent that the state both initiated and subsequently
facilitated illegal activities at PGDP through collusion
with PGDP administrators to conceal harms to workers
and prevent enforcement of safety regulations.
An important issue for conducting research on
state-corporate crime is whether organizations can be
legitimately regarded as offenders or whether they are
merely collections of individuals who ultimately exercise
control over their own actions. The history of criminology is dominated by a focus on the individual as offender
with theory directed at explaining individual criminality
(Clinard and Yeager, 1980). Yet as we describe below,
there has long been recognition that corporations operate
as distinct entities and can legitimately be classified as
offenders; this position is becoming more widely recog-
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nized by criminologists (Kauzlarich, 1995).
Legally, corporations were first identified as actors
punishable by criminal law in 1909 (Geis, 2005) when
the U.S. Supreme Court reasoned in New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad Company v United States that:
(t)here is a large class of offenses…wherein the
crime consists in purposely doing the things
prohibited by statute. In that class of crimes we
see no good reason why corporations may not be
held responsible for and charged with the knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within
the authority conferred upon them… to give
them immunity from all punishment because of
the old and exploded doctrine that a corporation
cannot commit a crime would virtually take away
the only means of effectually controlling the
subject-matter and correcting the abuses aimed
at [sic]. <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgibin/
getcase.pl?court=US&vol=212&invol=481>
Sociologists have long recognized that industrialization produced bureaucratic organizations comprising
positions that shape employee behavior by requiring
specific actions (e.g., Weber, 1947; Nelson, 1975; Hall,
1987), and that corporate action has significant impacts
upon society (e.g., Johnson and Douglas, 1978; Vaughan,
1983; Hall, 1987). A number of researchers argue that
organizations should be regarded as actors in their own
right. Kramer et al. (2002) identify three reasons why organizations should be seen as “real social actors.” First,
organizations persist over time; specific positions within
organizations persist and are filled by different people
required to perform the same tasks, thus the general
behavior of the organization persists. Second, accepted
organizational procedures and norms for conduct shape
individual behavior. Finally, organizational goals take
precedence over those of individual workers. Coleman
(2002:103) elaborates upon the precedence of organizational goals over those of individual workers by describing “the irrelevance of persons.” He notes that organizations comprise positions, rather than unique individuals,
and that what is needed is someone or something to fill
a particular position. Thus, if one person leaves an organization, cannot or will not perform required tasks, they
are easily replaced by someone who can and will perform
the tasks required by the overriding organizational goals.
Taken to its logical conclusion, Coleman (2002) argues
that as technology allows, an organizational position can
just as adequately be filled by a machine capable of the
required tasks as a person. Furthermore, corporate goals,

hierarchical structure that dilutes individual responsibility
and helps conceal wrongdoing, and the characteristics of
the arena in which a corporation operates all contribute to
corporate criminality regardless of individual employees
(Clinard and Yeager, 1980). Finally, as noted by Coleman
(1985:14) corporations can generate a tradition of criminal practices in pursuit of legitimate corporate goals, and
while:
(i)ndividual actors must still carry out the criminal deeds, there is ample evidence to show that
the attitudes and characteristics of the individual
offenders are often of little importance. Those
who refuse to carry out the illegal activities
demanded by their organization are simply replaced by others who will.
We believe, then, that the behavior of organizations
amounts to more than the collective actions of autonomous individuals and that organizations are a legitimate
focus of criminological inquiry.
Methods
The current research uses the case study approach
(Berg, 2001), which has previously been used to examine state-corporate crime (Kramer, 1992; Aulette
and Michalowski, 1993; Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1993;
Matthews and Kauzlarich, 2000). Specifically, we use
what Stake (2000:437) calls an instrumental case study
where “a particular case is examined mainly to provide
insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization. The
case is of secondary interest; it plays a supportive role,
and it facilitates our understanding of something else.”
Thus, while description of events at PGDP is important
and interesting, our goals include using this case to determine the usefulness of Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998)1
integrated theoretical framework for explaining state-corporate crime and to enhance understanding of this offense
type.
The nature of available data is of primary concern
in qualitative research (Platt, 1981; Yin, 1994) and,
as explained below, recent events have reduced access to official documents on PGDP. Our data sources
include government reports and media archives. Two
newspaper archives indexing articles about PGDP were
especially useful: The Washington Post archive, and The
(Louisville) Courier-Journal archive. We have used
primary data whenever possible; however, problems in
accessing certain information called for alternative data
sources. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the
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Department of Energy (DOE) has removed some reports
from its website until they are deemed appropriate for
public consumption. While we obtained much data prior
to this security measure, in some instances we have had
to rely on secondary sources, such as media coverage, for
additional information. In other instances, we have used
secondary reports when the news media asked impartial
experts to evaluate technical data contained in DOE
reports and releases. It is important for the reader to understand why we relied in part on newspapers, rather than
original sources, for some data; we are concerned with
understanding the state-corporate relationship leading to
harms at PGDP and following accepted practice in case
study research (see Platt, 1981; Yin, 1994) have examined
the most influential and informative documents.
History of the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
The United States began enriching uranium in the
early 1940s to produce fissionable material for the atomic
bomb (USEC, 2001). The Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC) eventually took control of the enrichment program, and the first plant began operation in 1945 (USEC,
2001). In October 1950, the U.S. government announced
that a new plant to produce enriched uranium for both
nuclear power production and nuclear weapons would
be located near Paducah, Kentucky (Office of Oversight,
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000). The decision
to locate the plant near Paducah was popular among
residents, as the area was experiencing a long period
of economic hardship. The community welcomed the
plant and the resulting economic prosperity brought new
residents. The economic benefits were so far-reaching
that “even the city’s brothel added a wing,” and Paducah
became known locally as “Boomtown” (Malone, 2000a).
The U.S. government’s decision to take advantage of
economic need to foster community support for controversial and dangerous activities is not without precedent
(Bullard, 1993; Bullard, 2000; Pellow, 2002).
Throughout its history PGDP has experienced
changes in contractors, operators and regulators. When
PGDP began producing enriched uranium in 1952, the
DOE contracted the Union Carbide Chemical Company
to operate the plant (Office of Oversight, Environment,
Safety and Health, 2000). In 1984, the Martin Marietta
Corporation replaced Union Carbide as the plant contractor (USEC, 2001). In 1993, the United States Enrichment
Corporation (USEC) leased the production facilities from
the DOE and managed the plant. USEC retained Martin
Marietta, now the Lockheed Martin Corporation, as the
plant contractor (USEC 2001). In 1997 USEC became
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a private corporation, and the following year it assumed
control of enrichment activities (Bechtel Jacobs Company,
2001).
There have also been changes in the regulatory agencies that had responsibility over activities at PGDP. In
January 1975, functions previously under the control of
the AEC were transferred to two different agencies: the
Energy Research and Development Agency (ERDA)
assumed responsibility for uranium enrichment, while
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) assumed
responsibility for the “regulatory oversight of nuclear
power plants” (USEC, 2001). In 1997, the DOE assumed
control of ERDA responsibilities (USEC, 2001).
The following descriptions help put into perspective the quantities of radioactive material processed at
PGDP:
(e)nough radioactive scrap metal to build a fullsize replica of the battleship Missouri; enough
low-level radioactive waste to cover more than
22 football fields a yard deep; enough polluted
ground water to fill 680,000 residential swimming pools. If laid end to end, the more than
37,000 cylinders of spent uranium being stored
outdoors would span 70 miles. (Carroll and
Malone, 2000a)
In June 1999, a whistleblower, or qui tam, suit was
filed against Lockheed Martin by three workers at PGDP
and the Natural Resources Defense Council, an environmental group, under the False Claims Act (Warrick,
1999b). The suit alleged that Lockheed Martin falsified
environmental safety reports and caused massive environmental damage by mishandling radioactive and chemical
materials (Bartleman, 2003). The False Claims Act allows private citizens to file qui tam lawsuits. In a qui
tam suit, whistleblowers collect a percentage of money
resulting from the lawsuit, while being protected against
retaliation stemming from the suit (Kohn, 2001). After
a qui tam suit is filed, the U.S. government may join the
plaintiffs and use its resources to pursue the case. In May
2003, the Justice Department reported that it would join
the lawsuit only for the allegations that hazardous wastes
were mishandled (Malone and Carroll, 2003).
Based on information from this lawsuit, The
Washington Post broke the story that workers at PGDP
had been “exposed to dangerous fission byproducts without their knowledge” (Warrick, 1999a). In the following years allegations and evidence of harm to workers,
the community, and the environment has continued to
mount.
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PGDP Harms
To fully demonstrate the harm arising from activities
at PGDP we present separately the harm to workers, and
harm to the public and environment.
Harm to Workers
In the 1950s and 1960s, workers and management
at PGDP did not fully understand the hazards of working
with radiation and certain chemicals (Office of Oversight,
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000). From early in
the plant’s history, management gave the impression that
employee exposure to dangerous radioactive materials
was minimal. This attitude is clearly reflected in managerial decisions that put employees in considerable danger.
For example, Paducah managers encouraged workers to
wear personal clothing rather than plant-issued protective
clothing even though it was thought workers were being
exposed to dangerous materials (Office of Oversight,
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000). Furthermore,
carelessness and a lack of knowledge led to contamination throughout the facility, including the plant’s lunch
room and theater (Office of Oversight, Environment,
Safety and Health, 2000). Workers were generally happy
in the belief that their efforts were protecting the country,
and in the 1950s some workers even took part in government radiation experiments that involved breathing radioactive gas and drinking uranium (Office of Oversight,
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000).
As early as 1953, concern was expressed about visible radioactive dust at PGDP, and in 1959 Union Carbide,
which then operated the plant, requested studies by the
AEC on the potential for health risks (Office of Oversight,
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000). Several times
in the plant’s history, recommendations that workers be
tested for potentially harmful exposures were ignored.
For example, a 1960 memo revealed that even though it
was recommended that 300 PGDP workers be tested for
exposure to neptunium, management declined to do so out
of fear the union would then request hazard pay (Office of
Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 2000). Also,
in 1985 a government task force recommended a study
be done to determine whether plant workers were being
exposed to uranium ash contaminated with high levels
of plutonium (Malone, 1999); once again, the study was
never conducted.
Because workers were exposed to radioactive and
other harmful materials, there would be a natural concern
about long-term health problems. A comparison of the
incidence of cancer around PGDP with national rates

reveals ten leukemia deaths when only one was projected
(Warrick, 1999d). Canadian researchers exhumed a former employee’s body in 1983 and tested the bones for
uranium. Although the results were not published at the
time, The Washington Post reported in 1999 that the tests
indicated uranium levels up to 133 times higher than normal (Warrick, 1999c). A 2001 DOE report acknowledges
that “(a)s many as 400 Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant
workers received an annual radiation dose up to 20 times
the limit now considered safe” (Malone, 2001). In addition:
(u)p to 4,000 workers performed duties between
1952 and 1985 in plant areas where they could
have received high radiation exposure. One in
10 received doses ‘that approached or exceeded’
regulatory limits … and many more workers
went untested because managers did not think it
necessary. (Carroll, 2000d)
The potential for harm to employees has continued
and there appears to be inadequate supervision to prevent
employees violating safety guidelines. Between 1994
and 1999, Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors
found several problems including workers pounding on a
uranium-plugged process line with a hammer, smuggling
beer into the plant, sleeping during the handling of liquid
uranium hexafluoride, and performing jobs without being
properly trained (Carroll, 1999a).
Harm to the Public and Environment
Reports indicate the public was not properly informed
about potential hazards associated with PGDP (Office
of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 1999;
Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health,
2000). For example, liquid waste that included uranium
and fission products was released “into ditches, ponds,
and streams, with subsequent flow into the Big and Little
Bayou creeks, ultimately reaching the Ohio river” (Office
of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 2000:20).
Although plant officials were aware of such problems,
they did not always act on such information, as illustrated
by a 1977 internal plant memo that acknowledged uranium discharges were being “significantly underestimated”
(Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health,
2000). Because of such acts, wells around the plant became contaminated, leading the government to provide
free municipal water to some residents and businesses
(Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health,
1999). Contaminated materials also were improperly
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removed from PGDP property. The Office of Oversight
report (Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and
Health, 2000) found that material released to the public—for example, old equipment that was sold—was not
always properly screened for contamination. In addition,
waste materials, such as scrap wood and metals, were not
adequately controlled as members of the public would
salvage these from PGDP property.
Evidence of potential harm to the community and environment has continued to emerge. In 1999, one lawsuit
plaintiff described recent problems at the plant: a computer from the plant that was supposed to be donated to
a school was discovered to be contaminated by radiation;
some members of a work team on a radioactive site failed
their training because, it turned out, they were functionally illiterate and could not read posted hazard signs;
cleanup teams were sent into a contaminated building
without protective breathing equipment; and no monitoring devices existed in places like cafeterias to ensure that
workers who may have been exposed to radiation do not
bring contamination with them (Carroll, 1999b).
Another recent problem included the 1999 discovery of “radioactive black ooze” seeping from ground
near PGDP (Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety
and Health, 1999). A year later, beryllium, a suspected
carcinogen, was discovered in soil, surface water, and
ground water samples beneath the plant; one soil sample
had 155 times the natural level (Malone, 2000b). More
effects of practices at PGDP were revealed in a study that
found “(m)ore than half of 44 raccoons examined had
above-normal radiation emissions…The findings are significant because raccoons eat almost anything, so if there
is contamination low in the food chain, it would show up
in them” (Carroll, 2000e). DOE maps released in 2000
showed that:
11 contaminants have spread extensively into
the recreation and wildlife areas surrounding the plant…Amounts of highly radioactive
neptunium were 509 times as high as what is
normally found in the environment, and radioactive cesium was found at levels up to 326 times
normal. (Malone, 2000d)
Even with reports such as these, the true extent of
problems at PGDP will never be known. It is estimated
that 27.4 percent of records about safety concerns were
destroyed before USEC took control of the plant in 1993
(Carroll and Malone, 2000b). These records are thought
to have included evidence of a lax attitude toward safety
by first-line supervisors, inconsistent investigations of
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accidents, purposeful violations of health and safety
rules by management and rank-and-file workers, and use
of old data and questionable analyses to assess environmental contamination (Carroll and Malone, 2000b). This
evidence suggests steps were taken to conceal evidence
relating to plant safety; the DOE has concluded that the
destruction of these computer and paper records was “inappropriate” (Carroll and Malone, 2000b).
Despite the evident harms and rule violations, between the mid-1980s and 2000, the state of Kentucky
fined the DOE only $5,000. “Kentucky officials say they
(were) hampered over the years by government secrecy, a
lack of resources and, until 1992, questions about whether
they could legally challenge the Energy Department”
(Malone and Carroll, 2000). Government secrecy about
nuclear activity is nothing new, and the present findings
are consistent with previous discoveries (Kauzlarich and
Kramer, 1998).
An Apology, Compensation, and Clean-Up
In 1980, after PGDP employee Joe Harding died
of cancer, the U.S. government refused to pay his wife
survivor benefits, claiming his illness was not related
to radiation exposure, and spent $1.5 million fighting
the claim (Shipley, 2001). Harding’s wife eventually
settled for $12,000 (Warrick, 1999c), but continued to
fight the case along with others who alleged harm. These
efforts contributed to passage of the $1.9 billion Energy
Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Act,
which provides medical and financial help for workers
and their families at a number of nuclear facilities where
dangerous work was conducted. The compensation plan
has a limit of $150,000 per claim and does not cover lost
wages due to “illness or injury from exposure to radiation
and hazardous chemicals” (Carroll, 2000b).
On May 31, 1994, the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion
Plant was identified for priority cleanup and added to the
Environmental Protection Agency’s Superfund national
priorities list. The DOE has established a clean-up schedule to be completed by 2010. More than $1.3 billion has
been allocated to deal with pollution in groundwater,
surface water, surface soils, burial grounds, waste barrels,
and unused process buildings, and to monitor the site and
issue clean-up reports (Jones, 2000).
On Sept. 16, 1999, the federal government took the
unusual step of issuing a formal apology for concealing
information that caused PGDP workers to be placed in
danger. Then-Energy Secretary Bill Richardson visited
Paducah and at a community meeting stated:
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On behalf of the U.S. government, I am here
to say I am sorry … We are apologizing to the
workers in Paducah. From the evidence that has
been uncovered recently, it’s obvious that the
U.S. government was not forthcoming about
possible exposure to plutonium, and that was
wrong. We should have been straight with our
employees. (Malone and Carroll, 1999)
While the DOE has estimated it will cost $1.3 billion
to clean up PGDP (Jones, 2000), other estimates suggest
the cost will be as high as $5 billion (Malone, 2000c).
There is also concern that even if the cleanup is completed by the 2010 deadline that will not mean the plant
is “clean” in the way most people understand the term.
Court action continues between federal and state authorities over what “clean” actually means (Carroll, 2000a).
While cleanup operations are now underway there is concern that they may not be properly conducted; regulators
have already cited the DOE for violating state-air quality
regulations while clearing “Drum Mountain” (Gil, 2000).
Drum Mountain is a 40 foot tall pile of discarded radioactive metal drums (Malone, 2000c).
Integrated Theoretical Framework
To fully understand state-corporate crime, Kauzlarich
and Kramer (1998) propose an integrated theoretical
framework that considers the impact of specific “catalysts
for action” at three levels of analysis. Traditional criminological theories typically focus on relations between
individual actors and exclude consideration of organizational or social structural factors on behavior. While
Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) recognize the importance
of the interactional level of analysis (face-to-face interaction, individual action) they also recognize this is
insufficient for more fully understanding organizational
behavior. It would be easy to blame the actions of individual employees for the harms at PGDP but such an approach is insufficient for understanding these harms as it
overlooks the vital role of organizational and institutional
factors. Organizational structure, goals, and culture are
important determinants of both organizational and individual behavior; thus, an organizational level of analysis
(structure and process) is also necessary to understand
state-corporate crime. Finally, both organizational and
individual behaviors are influenced by the broader social
context, so an institutional level of analysis (historical,
political, economical, and cultural factors) is necessary to
complete the analysis of state-corporate crime. At each
level of analysis, Kauzlarich and Kramer (1998) identify

the interaction of three “catalysts for action”: motivation,
opportunity structure, and social control. Kauzlarich and
Kramer’s (1998) integrated model helps illustrate how
institutional, organizational, and individual actors contributed to the events at PGDP.
Institutional Level of Analysis
Motivation. At the institutional level of analysis,
the Cold War climate encouraged use and development of
nuclear technology, created public support for the nuclear
industry, and created a sense of urgency in the development of nuclear technology. In such an atmosphere, the
perceived greater national good was given precedence
over health hazards to employees or environmental
damage. The perceived threat of nuclear weapons in the
Soviet Union meant that organizational goals were to be
quickly achieved, even at the expense of individuals and
the environment. This likely contributed to acceptance of
some “rule bending” in pursuit of apparently legitimate
goals. A 2000 DOE report points out that during the Cold
War, health, safety, and environmental concerns were
less important than the pressing demands of the Cold War
(Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health,
2000).
A number of governmental goals provided the motivation for rapid development of the nuclear industry,
and these goals could not have been achieved without
the involvement of private corporations. Duffy (1997)
describes the following governmental goals that motivated the rapid development of nuclear technology and
the involvement of private corporations: energy needs,
controlling nuclear proliferation, deterring the Soviets,
and remaining the leader in nuclear development.
Opportunity structure. Although the government
drove development of the nuclear industry, it would not
have flourished without the involvement of private corporations. The opportunity for private corporate involvement was created by passage of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954. Previously the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 had
“expressly forbidden private ownership of nuclear materials and had established an absolute government monopoly over nuclear energy” (Ford, 1982:41). The 1954
act reveals changing attitudes toward nuclear energy, as
it allowed “private companies to build and operate commercial nuclear-power stations” (Ford, 1982:41). Private
corporations had been reluctant to call for changes in
legislation to allow their involvement in the nuclear industry because of its financial uncertainties; the cost of
establishing nuclear production facilities, combined with
its potential for risk, scared corporations away from this
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technology. The federal government encouraged private
corporations to get involved and offered them economic
incentives to do so. Duffy (1997:34) states:
The “solution” to the government’s “problems”
was the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 which, in
effect, created both commercial nuclear power
and a commercial nuclear power industry. In
this sense, the development of commercial
nuclear power is unusual in that it emerged from
an effort initiated by government rather than by
private industry.
This is an important point for our argument that
harms at PGDP are initially an example of state-initiated state-corporate crime; from the beginning it was the
federal government that initiated involvement of private
corporations in the development of this field.
Government efforts to promote a peaceful image of
nuclear power contributed to the opportunity to develop
nuclear technology. These efforts included downplaying
the danger of nuclear technology and the need for safety
precautions, while emphasizing its advantages. In a
1953 address to the United Nations General Assembly,
President Eisenhower presented his vision of “atoms for
peace.” “The United States knows that peaceful power
from atomic energy is no dream of the future. That capability, already proved, is here-now, today,” Eisenhower
said. He went on to say that nuclear energy could be
used to “provide abundant electrical energy in the powerstarved areas of the world” (Ford, 1982:40). In 1954,
construction of the nation’s first commercial nuclear
power plant was presented to the public in dramatic fashion when Eisenhower appeared on television and, with
a wave of his hand, “signaled an unmanned, radio-controlled bulldozer to begin breaking ground” for the plant
(Stoler, 1985:16).
The events at PGDP can be classified as state-initiated state-corporate crime; they could not have occurred
without government efforts. Government created the
opportunity for development of the nuclear industry by
initiating the involvement of private corporations, and
waging a campaign that emphasized the nuclear threat to
the United States while changing perceptions of nuclear
technology as purely destructive.
Social control. At the institutional level, there has
historically been little social control over the nuclear
industry (Kauzlarich and Kramer, 1998). Secrecy has
dominated the industry, and government’s ability to single
out and replace people who violate its rules has helped
divert criticism. Nuclear technology was developed in
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an atmosphere of irresponsibility that minimized safety
concerns. According to former AEC attorney Harold
Green “nobody really ever thought safety was a problem.
They assumed that if you just wrote the requirement that
it be done properly, it would be done properly” (Ford,
1982:42). This laissez-faire approach to safety enforcement contributed to the absence of social control throughout the nuclear industry.
The comments of Edward Teller, head of the AEC’s
Reactor Safeguards Committee, illustrate how advancing
nuclear development was considered more important
than safety concerns. In a 1953 discussion on whether
to continue the practice of creating “exclusion distances”
around nuclear reactors to keep the public at safe distance, Teller warned that enforcement of safety regulations “must not stand in the way of rapid development of
nuclear power” (Ford, 1982:43). These comments reveal
that despite awareness of dangers involved in developing
nuclear technology, government was prepared to loosen
its control over the nuclear industry to achieve its goals.
A lax attitude at the institutional level creates an overall
climate that reduces the likelihood rigorous control efforts will be a priority in the nuclear industry.
In the case of PGDP, social control was inadequate
at the institutional level as regulatory agencies were often
lax in their investigation of the facility. State officials
in Kentucky were unclear as to the control they could
exercise over activities at PGDP; therefore, financial
penalties for safety violations were insufficient to deter
risky practices most efficient for achieving organizational
goals (Gil, 2000).
Organizational Level of Analysis
At the organizational level of analysis, there is considerable evidence that organizational goals encouraged
lax security practices and poor decisions regarding employee and environmental safety. While safety concerns
surfaced periodically, the general practice at PGDP was
to downplay these concerns and continue with the most
economical approach. Indeed, it is possible that some reductions in security measures were meant to demonstrate
to employees the degree of organizational confidence in
safety at PGDP.
Motivation. Evidence reveals that despite knowing the health risks to employees, plant managers were
motivated to pursue production goals at the expense of
employee safety and failed to effectively communicate
safety concerns to employees. The Department of
Energy’s Office of Oversight reported that during the
1950’s:
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(N)ot all workers had a clear understanding
of the need to wear anti-contamination clothing. Contributing to this situation was the
discretionary application of Carbide’s policy
on anti-contamination clothing and a non-conservative approach to the provision of company
clothes…Carbide management sought ways to
acquaint newly acquired personnel with known
hazards without impacting production. (Office
of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health,
2000:38)
Opportunity structure.
Plant administrators
habitually ignored safety warnings and, when faced
with alternatives, repeatedly chose hazardous means
as the most efficient way to meet organizational goals.
These practices increased the opportunity for employee
exposure to hazardous conditions. From the beginning
at PGDP, health and safety programs were in place, but
were inadequate:
The Health Physics Section from the commencement of operations until 1990 ranged in size from
as few as two to six employees. The Industrial
Hygiene Section typically consisted of one or
two industrial hygienists and a technician…in
the early decades, health and safety professionals had limited authority and resources to ensure
that line management would implement recommended hazard controls. (Office of Oversight,
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000:36)
While training sessions were held to inform employees of hazards, the Office of Oversight (2000) team noted
that from the 1950s to the 1960s the number of hours
devoted to hazard communication declined by as much as
50 percent. Thus, as knowledge of the dangers of working with nuclear materials increased, PGDP management
decreased the amount of safety training for employees,
therefore increasing the opportunity for employee harm.
Over time safety program training was replaced with onthe-job training as the principal means to keep workers
informed of hazards at the plant (Office of Oversight,
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000). Investigators
concluded that by the 1980s employees were given
less training than during the 1950s, despite the greater
knowledge of danger. Investigators further stated that although there were written materials to educate employees
about plant hazards “(t)here is no evidence of the extent
to which this information was either made available or
required reading, nor is there any indication of supervi-

sors’ diligence in ensuring that Plant health and safety
hazards were being communicated to workers” (Office of
Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 2000:39).
Although contamination control was known to be important for employee safety, such practices were neither
mandatory nor rigorously enforced until the mid-1980s.
At times, management provided workers with incorrect
information on contamination control, such as telling
that uranium compounds were safe enough to eat (Office
of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 2000).
Recommendations for safety and contamination control
were sometimes ignored; for example, although it was
recommended that employees wear respiratory protection devices, line managers did not always direct workers to follow the recommendation (Office of Oversight,
Environment, Safety and Health, 2000). In some cases,
management discouraged the use of protective clothing,
and in one part of the plant (the C-720 Control Valve Shop)
“evidence suggests that Paducah personnel routinely
exceeded personal clothing contamination limits without
corrective actions being taken by management” (Office
of Oversight, Environment, Safety and Health, 2000:45).
These organizational practices created the opportunity for
individual employees to violate safety requirements and
place themselves at considerable risk.
Social control. Social control was generally lacking as plant management failed to adequately implement
safety training and enforce employee compliance with
safety recommendations. The Office of Oversight investigators concluded that:
(i)mplementation of the radiological protection
program at PGDP was very inconsistent between
1952 and 1989. Limited health physics staffing,
a failure to communicate exposure levels and
transuranic hazards to workers, worker failure
to follow radiological control measures, a failure to consistently enforce radiological control
measures, and a lack of adequate understanding
and appreciation of the hazards of uranium and
transuranics all contributed to inconsistent implementation. (Office of Oversight, Environment,
Safety and Health, 2000:78)
Plant management created a climate in which workers
trusted that what they were doing was safe, and by downplaying the need to wear protective clothing, contributed
to an environment that did little to encourage the use of
precautions. Secrecy made this climate easy for management to perpetuate due to the “need to know basis” of
information about plant activities, and employee trust of
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their employer (Office of Oversight, Environment, Safety
and Health, 2000).
Interactional Level of Analysis
Motivation. At the interactional level, there was
considerable motivation for PGDP employees to perform
their assigned tasks. Employees had considerable financial motivation because they lived in an economically-depressed area before the opening of the gaseous diffusion
plant. They were also socialized in an environment that
assured the technology was safe and adequate protections
were in place. Workers had additional motivation in the
belief they were performing important tasks that contributed to national security.
Opportunity structure. At the individual level,
there was considerable opportunity to engage in hazardous activity. It is apparent that workers were socialized
into an environment in which illegal activities became the
norm and were defined as acceptable methods for “getting
the job done.” The absence of close supervision meant
employees were given many opportunities to engage in
hazardous activity.
Social control. From the beginning, PGDP employees had much to lose by refusing to follow organizational
instructions; thus, it is not surprising that they engaged
in questionable practices over an extended period. The
economic climate meant employees could not afford to
lose their sources of income. Individual workers employed a number of techniques of neutralization (Sykes
and Matza, 1957) in performing their duties, including
appeal to higher loyalties in the belief that their work was
a patriotic duty benefiting the entire country. There was
also no adequate system to control employee behavior
and enforce safety guidelines. Employees were ill-informed of risks and left to make their own decisions about
the need to take safety precautions. For these reasons,
workers were denied the opportunity to make informed
decisions concerning performance of duties and safety
precautions.
Conclusion
Our examination of harms at PGDP leads us to conclude that as government behavior changes these harms
constitute instances of both state-initiated and statefacilitated state-corporate crime. The U.S. government
made the decision to locate a nuclear plant at the Paducah
site and subsequently encouraged a generally lax attitude
towards safety, and harmed plant workers by deliberately exposing them to materials known to be harmful.
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Government also placed plant development ahead of environmental safety despite evidence of the inevitability of
environmental harm. We find Kauzlarich and Kramer’s
(1998) integrated theoretical framework to be very useful
in clarifying the complex relationship between catalysts
for action at different levels of analysis, and helps clarify
the roles of the state, private corporations, and individual
plant workers in the harms at PGDP. Analysis of events
and harms at PGDP reveals change in state contribution
to state-corporate crime. Specifically, utilizing the “complicity continuum” of state-corporate crime proposed by
Kauzlarich, Mullins and Matthews (2003) we find the
state role evolves from that of instigator to facilitator of
state-corporate crime at PGDP. Over the life of the plant
the state takes deliberate steps to transfer plant ownership
and operation to private corporations and transforms its
role to that of regulator; given the abysmal record of governmental efforts to enforce safety regulations at PGDP
we believe its role clearly changes from that of instigator
to facilitator of state-corporate crime.
Kauzlarich et al. (2003) further the study of statecorporate crime by locating it within a “complicity continuum.” That is, these authors distinguish types of state
crime by highlighting state behavior. They emphasize
that state crime arises from both state action (commission) and inaction (omission), and identify four distinct
categories of state crime. Explicit acts of commission
are the most extreme acts of deliberate state action towards clearly-specified goals, and are exemplified by the
Holocaust (Kauzlarich et al. 2003: 248). Implicit acts of
commission occur when “state agencies tacitly support
actions which result in social injury, but their connection
is more distant than proximal” (2003:248). Kauzlarich
et al. identify state-initiated state-corporate crimes as
examples of implicit acts of commission. Explicit acts
of omission “occur when the sate disregards unsafe
and dangerous conditions, when it has a clear mandate
and responsibility to make a situation or context safe”
(2003:249). We believe state-facilitated corporate crime
falls into this category. Finally, implicit acts of omission
refer to more general harmful social conditions the state
has the power to eliminate or reduce, such as economic
inequality. Kauzlarich et al. note that by “doing nothing
– or next to nothing – to ameliorate such problems, the
state is engaged in crime because it is allowing institutions and actions to remain inadequate, harmful, and marginalizing” (2003:250).
Government efforts to change its role in nuclear
plant involvement is clear from the passage of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 that allowed private corporate involvement in the nuclear industry; ultimately at PGDP
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this role change resulted in transfer of plant ownership
and operation to various private corporations, with the
state taking on responsibility for safety regulation. It is
clear that dangers associated with the nuclear industry
were known, and that through the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 the US government initiated participation of private
corporations. Given the government’s role in encouraging corporations to participate in a dangerous business,
it was government’s responsibility to implement and
enforce strict regulations to ensure safety of nuclear
plant employees and the public, however, government
efforts were entirely inadequate and sanctions were
rarely enforced for violations of safety standards. At the
organizational level, while safety guidelines were developed, safety programs were inappropriately staffed, and
it was generally left to line personnel to make sure that
safety measures were being followed. Given the climate
created by government and management, and the failure
of government to regulate and enforce safety standards
PGDP employees were unlikely to fully appreciate the
dangers of their work and thus unlikely to take adequate
precautions.
The Louisville Courier-Journal provides a good
summary of the harms caused to PGDP workers as well
as the community and surrounding area:
Sloppy safety practices, concealed health concerns, and decades of ignorance, expediency
and poor oversight have left workers, nearby
wildlife and the land itself damaged by chemical
and radioactive toxins. Workers have inhaled
the radioactive dust, chemicals have seeped into
the ground water, and debris dumped off the site
has created pockets of radiation. And the silent
devastation is being seen in creatures ranging
from insects to bobcats—an ominous warning
to the humans who share the same soil, water,
and air. (Carroll and Malone, 2000a)
In this case, as acknowledged by the federal government (Carroll, 2000c), a series of decisions from the
governmental level to the plant operators ensured PGDP
workers, the environment, and public safety were victims
of state-corporate crime. Kauzlarich and Kramer’s (1998)
theoretical framework helps clarify how such harms come
about, while Kauzlarich et al.’s (2003) “complicity continuum” highlights how the state role in state-corporate
crime can change over time.

Endnotes
1. Since we are focused on how useful Kauzlarich
and Kramer’s (1998) integrated theoretical model of
state-corporate crime is for understanding harm at PGDP
we rely heavily on their work in defining the concept and
framing issues discussed in the paper.
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